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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reading the publication could not ascertain that either of the plaintiffs
was referred to. Was the reason for this irreconcilable result
couched in the court's statement that plaintiffs were not persons of
prominence or in the public eye?
JOHN R. JENKINS, JR.
Mortgages--Adverse Possession by Mortgagor's Grantee
Against the Mortgagee.
The mortgagor sold the mortgaged realty to his tenant, the claim-
ant, who remained in possession under bond for title, paid substantial
back taxes, and on payment of the purchase price took a duly
recorded deed. The claimant occupied the land for more than seven
years, making valuable improvements and had no notice of the mort-
gage, except that of registration, until execution under foreclosure,
at which time he filed his claim. Although the mortgagee did not
know of the improvements, and although the mortgagor had kept up
payments of interest on the debt until foreclosure, verdict was di-
rected for the claimant on the ground that improvements and pay-
ment of taxes constituted sufficient notice of adverse possession to
start prescription running against the mortgagee.1
The court, in construing a Georgia statute, took the view that
only the claimant's actual knowledge of the mortgage, or bad faith,
could make his holding permissive; that record notice is effective only
to prevent subsequent deeds from passing clear title, but not to pre-
clude possession adverse in character; and that mere occupancy, plus
improvements under bond for title, known or unknown to the mort-
gagee, is hostile.2 A former case holding that the sale of mortgaged
premises did not repudiate the mortgage is distinguished by the court
on the ground that the grantee did not take possession, but the mort-
gagor stayed on as tenant.3 Though distinctly representing the
minority rule, the principal case does not stand entirely alone.4
'Chandler v. Douglas, 172 S. E. 54 (Ga. 1933).
2 GA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §4164, providing that "Possession to be the
foundation of a prescription must be in the right of the possessor, and not of
another; must not have originated in fraud. . . . Permissive possession cannot
be the foundation of a prescription until an adverse claim and actual notice to
the other party." Although it cited the statute, the court said: "The absence
of actual- notice on the part of Mrs. Chandler cannot alter the result because
Douglas was never in possession by permission of [the mortgagee]."
'Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683, 126 S. E. 718 (1925).
' Shreeve v. Harvey, 74 N. J. Eq. 336, 70 Atl. 671 (1910) ; Ely v. Wilson,
65 N. J. L. 544, 47 Atl. 806 (1900) (Except from this jurisdiction, there is
almost no direct authority in support of the instant case) ; see Denbo v. Boyd,
194 Mo. App. 121, 185 S. W. 236, 238 (1916); Ma Haffy v. Farris, 144 Ia.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Ordinarily the possession of the mortgagor or his grantee is con-
sistent with and not adverse to the rights of the mortgagee, this being
true whether the mortgage passes to the mortgagee legal title or
equitable lien.5 However, it is not true unless the grantee of the
mortgagor has constructive or actual notice of the mortgage, 6 but for
this purpose record is usually sufficient3 Even if the claimant has
notice, still his permissive occupancy may be changed to adverse
possession through repudiation of the mortgage: (1) in most states
by acts or words that bring to the mortgagee's actual notice8 the fact
that his rights are denied by the grantee claiming in his own right;
(2) in other states by acts or words that would put a reasonable man
on notice of such claim;9 and (3) in a few states, possibly only by
surrendering the possession entirely and returning as a stranger in
his own right.10
In all cases, the repudiation must be absolutely clear. Generally,
sale by the mortgagor, together with the recording of his deed, occu-
pancy, payment of back taxes, and improvements by the grantee, will
220, 122 N. W. 934, 935 (1909) ; Jamison v. Perry, 38 Ia. 14, 17 (1873) (This
case seems to be squarely in accord with the instant case, but it is declared
dictum by the Iowa court in Dodgon v. Heidman, 66 Ia. 645, 24 N. W. 257
(1885), which follows the majority rule).
Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. 289, 11 L. ed. 979 (U. S. 1846) ; Bristol Lumber
Co. v. Derby, 114 Conn. 88, 157 Atl. 640 (1931); Weathersby v. Goodwin, 175
N. C. 234, 95 S. E. 491 (1918); 2 CLARK, RicEivEns, §935 (At common law
the mortgagee had legal title to the mortgaged property; today almost all the
states are numbered among the so called "lien" jurisdictions, legal title re-
maining in the mortgagor; North Carolina retains the common law rule).0 Lemker v. Unknown Claimant, 201 Ia. 902, 208 N. W. 290 (1926); Baker
v. Evans, 4 N. C. 417 (1816).
7 Christopher v. Shockley, 199 Ala. 681, 75 So. 158 (1917) ; Baker-Matthews
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Lepanto, 170 Ark. 1146, 282 S. W. 995 (1926); Parker
v. Banks, 79 N. C. 480 (1878).
' Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co., 182 Cal. 616, 189 Pac. 1073 (1920); Bristol
Lumber Co. v. Derby, supra note 5; Alsup v. Stewart, 194 Il1. 959, 62 N. E.
795 (1902) ; see Johnson v. Bean, 119 Mass. 271, 272 (1876) ; 2 JoNEs, MoaRT-
GAGES (8th ed. 1928) §830. Practically all states require that the mortgagee
have actual knowledge of the adverse claim.9 Ringo v. Ruff, 43 Ark. 469 (1884) ; Talbot v. Cook, 57 Ore. 535, 112 Pac.
709 (1911); 1 WiLTSiE, MORTGAGES (4th ed. 1927) §80; JoNES, MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) §830. Nowhere do judges or writers say just what acts will
put a reasonable man on notice.
"0 See Parker v. Banks, 79 N. C. 480 (1878) ; Williams v. Kerr, 113 N. C.
306, 18 S. E. 501 (1891) (The North Carolina court takes the position that
the grantee of the mortgagor cannot hold adversely to the mortgagee unless he
occupies without notice, but that record is notice; that "nothing short of pay-
ment of the mortgage debt will end the mortgage relation"; that the grantee
has only the right of redemption, and is the tenant of the mortgagee) ; N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §433 (provides that a tenant remaining in pos-
session holds in subordination to his lord for twenty years after the end of
the term.).
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not suffice, even though such facts are known to the mortgagee, be-
cause they could easily be consistent with a continued recognition of
the mortgage.:1 Any act done in deference to the mortgage, such as
payments on the debt, conclusively rebuts any possibility of repu-
diation.12
Even in its own jurisdiction, the instant case is not unquestioned.
It is weakened by the fact that the authority upon which the court
expressly bases its decision is not only not squarely in point, but also
rests ultimately upon the dictum of another case.'8 In two other
Georgia cases a clear inference and a strong dictum seem flatly
contra to the result reached in the principal case. 14 Furthermore,
there is an early decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
overruling a very similar holding by a circuit court sitting in
Georgia.15
In those jurisdictions in which a mortgagee is held to get only a
lien to secure his debt, the grantee of the mortgagor has legal title
and the right to possession, and the mortgagee cannot bring eject-
ment.'0 It is difficult to see how possession by the grantee of the
mortgagor can be adverse to the mortgagee who cannot sue to re-
cover the land. It follows that the lien cannot be "repudiated," but
lives until the debt is paid or barred by the statute of limitations.
Hence it appears that the position of those states which allow hostile
words or acts to constitute adverse possession against the mortgagee
to defeat his lien, he having no title which prescription can take out
'New England Mortgage Co. v. Fry, 143 Ala. 637, 42 So. 57 (1904);
Harding v. Durand, 36 Ill. App. 238 (1890) (The claimant cannot break the
mortgage relation by allowing the land to be sold for taxes and buying it
back) ; cases supra notes 7 and 8.
Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat 489, 6 L. ed. 142 (U. S. 1824) ; Wright v.
Eaves, 10 Rich. Eq. 582 (S. C. 1858).
'Baxter v. Phillips, 50 Ga. 498, 104 S. E. 196- (1920) (Here the mortgagee
had actual notice of the improvements and claims of the grantee, whereas he
did not have in the instant case) ; Garrett v. Adrian, 44 Ga. 274 (1871) (This
case was cited by the court in Baxter v. Phillips as grounds for its decision,
yet it does not clearly appear from the facts of Garret v. Adrian that the prior
incumbrance was ever recorded, as it was in the instant case).
14 Parker v. Jones, 57 Ga. 204 (1876) (The court said that since the mort-
gage was not recorded, the grantee of the mortgagor held adversely to the
mortgagee, the inference being that in case of registration the result would be
contra) ; Dearing v. Hawkins, 93 Ga. 108, 19 S. E. 717 (1894) (Of a claimant
in a situation exactly similar to that of the principal case, except for the time
element, the court said that even if the grantee had stayed on the land seven
years, the lien of the mortgagee would not thereby be destroyed.
'I Higginson v. Mein, 4 Cranch 415, 2 L. ed. 664 (U. S. 1808).
"°Green v. Coast Line Railroad, 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814 (1895) ; GA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3256.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of him and put into the claimant, is anomalous, 17 and that the view
of the instant case in its own jurisdiction is altogether untenable.
In jurisdictions in which it is held that the mortgagee gets legal
title to the land the situation is reversed and, nothing to the contrary
appearing in the mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to sue for
the recovery of the land, whereas the grantee of the mortgagor has
only the right of redemption.' 8 Hence the Georgia view is at least
arguable in such states on the ground that, given the usual elements
of adverse possession, it would be possible for prescription to trans-
fer title from the mortgagee to the claimant. In North Carolina,
which belongs to the "title jurisdiction" category, any such argument
is defeated by the fact that the record is held to be even better than
actual notice.1 9
J. L. CARLTON.
Mortgages: Assumption of the Debt: Defenses.
A mortgaged land to B. C mortgaged other land to D. A's
property was immediately conveyed to X. Co., which was controlled
by A. Pursuant to an agreement between A, acting for X. Co., and
C, each deeded his property to the other. Each assumed the debt
secured by the property conveyed to him. In an action by B against
C on his assumption of the debt, C set up the defense that A had
made no attempt to pay D and, hence, had breached a condition of
the contract which C agreed to pay B. Held, a valid defense.'
It is no longer open to serious doubt that when a purchaser of
the equity of redemption assumes payment of the mortgage debt, the
mortgagee may proceed against him directly; however, the decisions
are in conflict as to the theory under which liability attaches. Some
hold that the purchaser becomes the principal debtor and the grantor
a surety.2 Others allow the mortgagee to recover upon the broad
principle that a promise made by one person to another for the
benefit of a third may be enforced by that third person.3 Formerly
North Carolina did not recognize this latter ground for recovery by
' Templeman & Son v. Kemper, 223 S. W. 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(The court says that title is not in issue in a suit to foreclose the mortgage
lien, and hence that title by prescription cannot be set up as a defense.).
Stephenson v. Turlington, 186 N. C. 191, 119 S. E. 210 (1923) ; McINTosH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§161, 211.
" Supra note 10.
1 Land Bank v. Page, 206 N. C. 18 (1934).
'(1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 96.
'Marble Say. Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa 285, 70 N. W. 198 (1897).
